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Competing with Antitrust Laws 
HOW NEW YORK’S POST AND HOLD LIQUOR LAW 
WILL LOSE AGAINST THE SHERMAN ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
The distribution and sale of alcohol has a colorful past 
in this country,1 and in certain respects, remains controversial 
to this day.2 While we no longer live in the “Wild West” and are 
thus no longer concerned with the dangers of saloons,3 alcohol 
is still linked to a host of societal problems.4 In response to the 
social evils tied to alcohol, the states rely on both their police 
powers and the authority granted to them by the Twenty-first 
Amendment to promote temperance.5 Accordingly, the states 
have enacted a variety of laws designed to achieve this goal.6 
  
 1 See generally Sidney J. Spaeth, The Twenty-First Amendment and State 
Control Over Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REV. 
161, 165-80 (1991) (recounting the origins of the battle for prohibition as linked to “the 
ubiquitous image of the debauched saloon” as fuel for the temperance movement). For 
example, in the 1800s, violence broke out against saloons, and women who were 
advocating temperance resorted to attacking saloons, with the hatchet as their “weapon 
of choice.” See id. at 169 (describing Carry Nation’s “‘hatchetations’ on Kansas saloons”). 
 2 See infra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 3 See Clayton L. Silvernail, Smoke, Mirrors and Myopia: How the States Are 
Able to Pass Unconstitutional Laws Against the Direct Shipping of Wine in Interstate 
Commerce, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 499, 505 (2003). 
 4 Alcohol is a leading cause of car accidents, especially car accident fatalities. 
See, e.g., Bureau of Transportation Services: Table 2-20: Fatalities in Crashes by 
Number of Vehicles and Alcohol Involvement, http://www.bts.gov/publications/national 
_transportation_statistics/html/table_02_20.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2010); MADD 
Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving: Statistics, http://www.madd.org/Drunk-
Driving/Drunk-Driving/Statistics/AllStats.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). Alcohol is a 
necessary component of binge drinking and often a major factor in hazing among 
college students. See generally HANK NUWER, WRONGS OF PASSAGE: FRATERNITIES, 
SORORITIES, HAZING, AND BINGE DRINKING (1999). Excessive use of alcohol leads to 
severe liver damage and is actually the “[third] leading lifestyle-related cause of death 
for people in the United States each year.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: 
Alcohol and Public Health, http://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2010). 
 5 “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession 
of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of 
the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
 6 See, e.g., infra notes 34, 99, 106, 151-152 and accompanying text. 
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New York, like many other states,7 has enacted “price posting” 
and “post and hold” liquor laws designed to regulate the 
distribution of alcohol within the state.8 New York’s price 
posting law requires manufacturers and wholesalers to file 
price schedules that report future prices.9 The law is also 
considered a “post and hold” law, as it requires them to make 
resale prices public, then hold those prices for a defined period 
of time, rather than allow prices to fluctuate based on market 
forces.10 
As with many other liquor laws,11 there has been 
controversy over the years regarding the validity of the price 
posting laws, especially those classified as post and hold.12 This 
Note argues that New York’s post and hold law is in 
contravention of the Sherman Antitrust Act13 and hard to 
defend under current Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence, 
which has steadily limited the broad grant of powers given to 
the states regarding the control of liquor within their borders.  
Part I provides background information on both the 
history of alcohol distribution in the United States and the 
Sherman Act, as well as a brief overview of New York’s 
distribution system. Part II analyzes the evolution of the 
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Twenty-
first Amendment, illustrating how the Court has shifted its 
interpretation of the Amendment from a broad grant of 
authority to the states over liquor regulation to a balancing of 
competing interests.14 Part III examines the steps of a federal 
antitrust challenge to a state law, and describes the federal 
decisions that specifically address the validity of price posting 
laws in Oregon,15 Maryland,16 and Washington,17 which closely 
resemble New York’s statute. Part IV concludes that the New 
  
 7 For example, Oregon, Maryland, and Washington all had price posting 
laws. See infra notes 222-223, 235, 249 and accompanying text. 
 8 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b (McKinney 2009). 
 9 Id. § 101-b(3)(a). 
 10 Id. § 101-b(3)(b). 
 11 See, e.g., infra notes 34, 97-99, 106, 151-152 and accompanying text. 
 12 See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 895-96 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that Washington’s “post and hold” liquor distribution regime violated the 
Sherman Act); accord TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 209-10 (4th Cir. 2001); 
Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344, 1349-51 (9th Cir. 1987); see also infra Part III.B. 
 13 See 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2006). 
 14 See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. 
 15 See Miller, 813 F.2d 1344. 
 16 See TFWS, Inc., 242 F.3d 198.  
 17 See Costco, 522 F.3d 874. 
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York statute will not be able to survive an antitrust challenge 
in light of these recent cases because the state most likely 
cannot put up the formidable defense now required by the 
Supreme Court. As it stands, New York’s post and hold regime 
should be struck down if challenged in court.  
In late 2009, the New York State Law Revision 
Commission completed a two-year review of the New York 
Alcohol Beverage Control Law (the “ABC Law”), of which price 
posting is one narrow issue.18 In its final report, the 
Commission flagged Section 101-b as a potential source of legal 
problems for the state due to the evolving nature of Twenty-
first Amendment jurisprudence, especially in light of the 
invalidation of several post and hold liquor laws by the federal 
courts.19 Thus, the state may actually be in a good position to 
take protective action if it so desires. 
I. BACKGROUND OF ALCOHOL AND ANTITRUST LAWS 
A. A Brief History of Alcohol Distribution in the United 
States 
With the exception of Prohibition, there has always been 
prolific regulation of commerce in alcohol by the states, largely 
because governments viewed it as a source of revenue.20 The 
real controversy over alcohol regulation began in the early to 
mid-1800s, when religious opposition began to form against 
alcohol consumption.21 As a result of the lobbying efforts of anti-
saloon groups and temperance societies, many states passed 
laws banning saloons and the “manufacture of ‘spirituous or 
  
 18  See NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT ON THE ALCOHOL 
BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 1, 23 (December 15, 2009), available 
at http://www.lawrevision.state.ny.us/abcls.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
 19 See id. at 217-20 (warning that the fact that Section 101-b survived an 
earlier antitrust challenge “should not make . . . the Legislature sanguine about the 
price posting and hold requirements.”). 
 20 See RICHARD MCGOWAN, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE ALCOHOL 
INDUSTRY: THE SEARCH FOR REVENUE AND THE COMMON GOOD 3-6, 35 (1997) 
(“Throughout the history of the American alcohol industry, government has played a 
pivotal role in determining where, when, and how alcoholic beverages are sold. Every 
level of government (federal, state, and local) has revenue as well as regulatory interest 
in the industry.”).  
 21 See W. J. Rorabaugh, Reexamining the Prohibition Amendment, 8 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 285, 288 (1996) (“The temperance campaign that started in the 1820’s 
demanded personal abstinence both as the price of church membership and as a badge 
of middle-class respectability.”); MCGOWAN, supra note 20, at 41 (noting that there was 
no religious opposition to the alcohol industry prior to the 1850s). 
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intoxicating liquors.’”22 Enforcement was largely unsuccessful 
because liquor continued to be smuggled across state lines,23 
and ultimately, the laws were repealed or struck down by state 
courts, at least in part, as unconstitutional.24 However, when 
the issue reached the Supreme Court in Mugler v. Kansas,25 the 
Court held that complete prohibition of alcohol sale and 
production was within a state’s police power.26 Thirteen years 
later, the Supreme Court declared that Mugler “stood for the 
‘undoubted right’ of states to regulate their internal affairs.”27  
While the states were given free range to extensively 
regulate alcohol within their borders, Prohibitionists28 were 
  
 22 Silvernail, supra note 3, at 505; see also Spaeth, supra note 1, at 168-69. 
These laws were commonly referred to as “Maine laws.” See id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Rorabaugh, supra note 21, at 288-89 (noting that Maine was 
the first state to enact prohibition). 
 23 Rorabaugh, supra note 21, at 289. 
 24 There were several factors that led to the repeal of most of these early 
prohibition laws. First, they met strong opposition from immigrants and anti-reform 
groups. See JACK S. BLOCKER, IAN R. TYRRELL, AND DAVID M. FAHEY, ALCOHOL AND 
TEMPERANCE IN MODERN HISTORY: A GLOBAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 395 (2003) (explaining 
that immigrants and anti-reform groups became instrumental in the demise of the 
Maine laws by joining anti-temperance coalitions to speak out against them). 
Moreover, the laws were undermined by court rulings, including being struck down as 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., People v. Toynbee, 2 Parker Crim. Rep. 329 (N.Y. 1855) 
(finding that the prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors was an unconstitutional 
interference with property in violation of individuals’ due process rights); see also 
BLOCKER, supra at 395 (by the end of the Civil War, most prohibition laws were 
“unenforced, overturned, or struck down by state courts as unconstitutional.”); see also 
RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE REFORM, 
LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880-1920, at 20 (1995) (stating that most 
prohibition laws were rendered ineffective by the courts). Finally, the Civil War 
distracted proponents of temperance, to the point where “progress” was not only halted 
but reversed. Id. Even the laws that still survived after the Civil War suffered from 
“admittedly lax enforcement.” Id. 
 25 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Kansas was the first state to “go dry” by going further 
than the Maine laws and amending its constitution to forbid the manufacture and sale 
of alcohol within its borders. See Silvernail, supra note 3, at 505-06.  
 26 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 662. 
 27 Silvernail, supra note 3, at 507 (quoting Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 122 
(1890)) (“The effect of Leisy and prior decisions . . . was to give states carte blanche 
with regards to regulating intoxicating liquors within their bounds.”). 
 28 An early group of Prohibitionists were working-class Americans—the 
Washingtonians—who “pledg[ed] not to drink any alcoholic liquors.” See HAMM, supra 
note 24, at 20. The movement spread to the middle class, who also sought to end 
alcohol consumption. Id. After the Civil War, abstinence increasingly became a 
religious talking point, “[i]n particular, pietists, members of evangelical sects, including 
Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians . . . saw prohibition as a needed corrective to 
the nation’s moral laxity and resulting social problems.” Id. at 22 (noting that religion 
was linked with ethnicity, and therefore Americans of English, Scottish, and 
sometimes Scandinavian descent were more likely to support Prohibition than the 
Irish, German, Italian, and Polish.) Two major Prohibitionist groups were the 
Prohibition Party, whose members came primarily from the Republican Party, and the 
National Women’s Christian Temperance Union, which consisted of middle-class 
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concerned that the states could not ban the importation of 
alcohol.29 In response to this dilemma, they lobbied Congress for 
states’ rights to keep alcohol out entirely, and their efforts were 
rewarded by the enactment of the Wilson Act in 1890.30 The 
Wilson Act subjected imported alcohol to a state’s applicable 
laws upon arrival.31 Unfortunately for the Prohibitionists,32 soon 
after the Wilson Act’s enactment, the Supreme Court suggested 
that the Act did not give the states permission to prohibit the 
importation of alcohol.33 The Court cemented this position seven 
years later, explicitly holding that laws interfering with the 
importation of alcohol were “wholly incompatible with and 
repugnant to” individuals’ constitutional right to ship and 
receive goods to and from another state.34  
Perhaps deflated by the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the Wilson Act, the Prohibitionists lobbied Congress yet 
again to give states the right to ban alcohol importation,35 
which led to the passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act in 1913.36 The 
Webb-Kenyon Act specifically authorized states to keep alcohol 
out of their borders.37 The Act survived a constitutional 
  
women. See id. at 23-24. The Anti-Saloon League, “one of the most powerful political 
organizations in United States history,” was another prohibitionist group, made up of 
churches and other temperance societies. Spaeth, supra note 1, at 170. 
 29 See Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 500 (1888). 
 30 See 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2006). 
 31 Id. (stating, in relevant part, that imported alcohol “shall upon arrival in 
[a] State . . . be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State . . . enacted 
in the exercise of its police powers”). 
 32 See Silvernail, supra note 3, at 508 (describing the Wilson Act as a “hollow 
victory for the Prohibitionists” because the Supreme Court failed to interpret the Act as 
authority for the states to ban liquor importation). 
 33 Id. at 509 (“[The Wilson Act] simply removed an impediment to the 
enforcement of the state laws . . . . [i]t imparted no power to the state not then 
possessed . . . .”) Many people argue that the Wilson Act was intended to allow dry 
states to remain dry, or at least that the Supreme Court should have interpreted it in 
such a way. See, e.g., Spaeth, supra note 1, at 172-73 & n.81 (explaining the impetus 
behind the passage of the Wilson Act, and quoting Senator Kenyon of Iowa, who 
expressed dismay that the Act was not used in such a way to give states the option to 
remain dry). 
 34 Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 455 (1898) (striking down a 
law giving state agents the exclusive right to purchase imported alcohol, because the 
law gave the state, via its agents, opportunity to discriminate against sister states by 
selectively choosing which to buy from); see also Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 420 
(1898) (rejecting Iowa’s argument that the phrase “upon arrival” in the Wilson Act gave 
the state authority to seize imported alcohol the moment it crossed state lines because 
such an interpretation would give Iowa’s law “extraterritorial operation,” thus 
“render[ing] the act of Congress repugnant to the Constitution of the United States”). 
 35 See Silvernail, supra note 3, at 511. 
 36 See 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2006). 
 37 Id. (providing, in relevant part, that “[t]he shipment or transportation . . . 
of any [alcohol] . . . from one State . . . into any other State . . . in violation of any law of 
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challenge in James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland 
Railway Company,38 in which the Supreme Court upheld a 
West Virginia law that prohibited the importation of alcohol for 
personal use.39 It was not long after the passage of the Webb-
Kenyon Act that the Prohibitionists finally achieved their 
desired goal with the ratification of the Eighteenth 
Amendment in 1919, which banned alcohol entirely.40 However, 
the Prohibitionists ultimately lost their battle when the 
experiment of Prohibition failed miserably by lasting a mere 
fourteen years.41 The Twenty-first Amendment was ratified in 
1933 and is the current source of constitutional authority 
granted to the states regarding the regulation of liquor.42 The 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the extent of this authority 
has fluctuated over time,43 as discussed in detail in Part III. 
The price posting liquor laws have repeatedly been challenged 
as violations of the Sherman Act; thus, an elementary 
understanding of antitrust law, specifically the Sherman Act, 
will be helpful in addressing the constitutionality of New 
York’s price posting law.  
B. A Brief Introduction to the Sherman Antitrust Act 
Antitrust laws . . . are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.44 
For better or worse,45 the American economy is founded 
on free enterprise. In order for free enterprise to produce and 
  
such State . . . is prohibited”). Interestingly, President Taft vetoed the Act as “an 
unconstitutional delegation by Congress to the states of the exclusive power to regulate 
interstate commerce in liquors.” Spaeth, supra note 1, at 173-74. Congress, however, 
overrode Taft’s veto. Id. at 174. 
 38 242 U.S. 311 (1917). 
 39 See id. at 332. 
 40 U.S. Const. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933) (“[T]he manufacture, sale, or 
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the 
exportation thereof from the United States . . . is hereby prohibited.”); see also 
Silvernail, supra note 3, at 512. 
 41 The Eighteenth Amendment completed ratification in 1919 and was 
repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, 
Historical Notes (repealed 1933); U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 42 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see also Silvernail, supra note 3 at 500 (“The 
Twenty-first Amendment gives the states the power to regulate the manufacture, 
distribution, and sale of intoxicating liquors within their borders”). 
 43 See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. 
 44 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 45 See JOHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS 6 
(1993) (noting that a common critique of America’s market economy is its potential for 
abuse and inevitable inequality). 
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maintain a flourishing economy, there must be competition.46 
Competition promotes consumer welfare47 and efficiency.48 Since 
competition is vital to the success of the American economy, it 
is no surprise that laws have been enacted to prevent private 
actors from subverting it.49 The most basic, and most important, 
“pro-competition” law is the Sherman Antitrust50 Act51 (the 
“Sherman Act”).52  
The Sherman Act has lofty goals: it seeks to protect and 
encourage producers by “diffus[ing] economic power and 
maximiz[ing] individual opportunity” to create a “fair” playing 
field, while simultaneously “maximiz[ing] efficiency and 
consumer welfare.”53 To effect these goals, the Sherman Act 
“proscribes agreements in restraint of trade”54 as well as 
“monopoly abuse.”55 Relevant types of prohibited restraints of 
  
 46 See id. at 7 (“The engine of free enterprise is competition.”). 
 47 See id. The authors point out that “[n]umerous sellers, vying for customers, 
must produce goods and services of sufficient quality, and at acceptable prices, or be 
driven from the field.” Id. Such a system results in better (and usually more) options 
for consumers because sellers have an incentive to be innovative to attract new 
customers and increase profits, or at least maintain a consistent quality of product to 
keep their current customers. See id. at 12. 
 48 See id. at 7 (“[The] necessity [of vying for consumers] forces [sellers] to be 
efficient, to buy so-called inputs—labor and materials—at the lowest possible prices, 
and . . . [keep] production costs . . . to a minimum.”). 
 49 See id. (noting that one way competition can fail is when “private 
participants in the market subvert competition and thus prevent market forces from 
operating freely”). 
 50 “Antitrust” laws are so named as a result of practices of the large enterprises 
of Standard Oil, sugar, whiskey, and others of taking the forms of “trusts,” placing 
“shareholder voting power in the hands of a single managing trustee.” See id. at 8. 
 51 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006). Additional antitrust laws were enacted to 
strengthen the Sherman Act. See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 9. Major 
ones include the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id. 
 52 WALTER ADAMS & HORACE M. GRAY, MONOPOLY IN AMERICA, v (1955) 
(describing the Sherman Act as “the first and most important antitrust [law]”). 
 53 SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 13; see also ADAMS & GRAY, supra 
note 52, at 177 (“competition provides an effective technique for reconciling the dual 
objectives of economic welfare and economic freedom.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 54 SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 14; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1. A 
restraint of trade refers to an action or condition that is intended to prevent free 
competition in business. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). The Sherman Act 
refers to “contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy” as opposed to the term “agreement.” 
15 U.S.C. § 1. Because Professors Lopatka and Page make a compelling argument that 
the Supreme Court is primarily concerned with the “element of agreement” when 
applying this section, see John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, State Action and the 
Meaning of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid Restraints, 20 
YALE J. ON REG. 269, 278-79 & notes 38-43 (2003), this Note will generally use the term 
“agreement” as well to reflect the Sherman Act’s prohibition of concerted action to 
unreasonably restrain trade. 
 55 See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 17; see 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
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trade include vertical price restraints and horizontal price 
fixing—as exemplified by New York’s ABC Law § 101-b. 
Vertical price restraints involve attempts by 
manufacturers to set the prices at which their distributors will 
resell the manufacturers’ goods to consumers.56 This type of 
behavior, also known as resale price maintenance,57 falls within 
the category of “agreements in restraint of trade.”58 Post and 
hold laws have typically been treated as horizontal price fixing, 
which generally involves an agreement among competitors to 
increase, set, or maintain prices.59 Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
provides that agreements in restraint of trade are illegal, and 
thus actors who violate Section 1 may be subject to criminal 
prosecution.60 The key concept in Section 1 is concerted action, 
or “agreement,” because without collective action there can be 
no violation of the provision, no matter how anticompetitive an 
individual’s conduct.61  
The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 1 to apply 
only to restraints of trade that are unreasonable,62 and has 
developed two categories of such unreasonable restraints.63 
First, there are restraints that are deemed unreasonable per 
se, and accordingly, these are per se violations of Section 1.64 
  
 56 See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 65. For a simple example: 
Company A manufactures whiskey and sells it to wholesalers, such as Costco or Sam’s 
Club, but only on the stipulation that they will sell the whiskey to their consumers at 
$30 per bottle. This agreement is a vertical price restraint because Company A, as an 
upstream, or vertical, seller, is setting prices for a downstream seller rather than 
allowing market forces (supply and demand) to control the resale price of the whiskey. 
The same analysis would apply to a wholesaler who imposed a similar condition on 
downstream retail liquor stores that purchase the whiskey for future resale to 
individual consumers. 
 57 See id. at 66. 
 58 SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 15; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 59 See infra Part III.B.; see also Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys, Antitrust 
Resource Manual, Identifying Sherman Act Violations, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title7/ant00008.htm (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2010). 
 60 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations is declared to be 
illegal. Every person who shall [engage in the prohibited activity] shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony.”). 
 61 15 U.S.C. § 1; see also Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 273; SHENEFIELD 
& STELZER, supra note 45, at 15. 
 62 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 60-62 (1911). 
 63 See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 15-16. 
 64 See id. at 16; see also N. Pac. Ry. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (in which the 
Supreme Court states that “there are certain agreements or practices which because of 
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively 
presumed to be unreasonable.”). 
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Per se unreasonable restraints include price-fixing.65 The 
second category of unreasonable restraints of trade consists of 
restraints that are assessed under the “rule of reason.”66 In 
addition to requiring an agreement to unreasonably restrain 
trade, the Sherman Act also requires that the wrongful conduct 
(i.e., anticompetitive practices) result in “competitive injury.”67 
Competitive injury includes artificially high prices, limited 
output of goods or services, or exclusion of competitors.68 In 
summary, a vertical price restraint that violates the Sherman 
Act is one that involves an agreement to restrain trade (by 
setting/controlling prices irrespective of market forces) that 
causes competitive injury. New York’s price posting scheme, of 
which Section 101-b is an integral part, contemplates just such 
a prohibited restraint.69 
C. A Brief Overview of New York’s Price Posting Scheme 
New York maintains a “three tier” alcohol distribution 
system.70 This means that, with the exception of direct shipping 
in wine,71 a manufacturer must sell alcohol to New York 
wholesalers, who in turn sell to retailers, who then sell to 
  
 65 See ADAMS & GRAY, supra note 52, at 164; see infra notes 252-253 and 
accompanying text. 
 66 SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 16. In general, antitrust law is 
not always black-and-white, and many activities are examined by the courts to 
determine “whether, on balance, the conduct is procompetitive or anticompetitive.” Id. 
 67 Id. at 32 (“[T]he basic inquiry concerns competitive injury . . . .”). Market 
participants can cause competitive injury without violating the Sherman Act, however. 
For example, a firm with a monopoly in a market is not necessarily violating the 
Sherman Act despite the fact that its conduct decreases competition by excluding 
competitors, as long as the firm did not achieve its monopoly status by entering into 
agreements with other firms to establish their respective market positions, as opposed 
to individually competing for consumers. See id. at 36 (“[P]ure, lawfully attained 
monopoly is not prohibited.”). 
 68 Id. at 32. 
 69 See infra Part IV. 
 70 See Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2009) (describing 
New York’s three-tier regulatory system); see also FTC, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS 
TO E-COMMERCE: WINE 5-7 (July 2003) (hereinafter FTC REPORT), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). 
 71 New York permits both out-of-state and in-state wineries to ship directly to 
consumers. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 79-c, -d. For the interested reader, direct 
shipping of wine is also a controversial issue. The Supreme Court recently discussed 
the issue in Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), and there are numerous scholarly 
articles available for more information. See e.g. Elizabeth Norton, The Twenty-first 
Amendment in the Twenty-first Century: Reconsidering State Liquor Controls in Light 
of Granholm v. Heald, 67 OHIO ST. L. J. 1465, 1471 (2006); Silvernail, supra note 3. 
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consumers.72 The New York State Liquor Authority (the “SLA”) 
is responsible for enforcing New York’s Alcohol Beverage 
Control Law, which is a complex set of laws that generally 
prohibits deviation from the “three tier” system.73  
This Note focuses on the “price posting” statute within 
the ABC Law, specifically whether compliance with the law is a 
violation of the Sherman Act. New York’s price posting scheme 
is found in Section 101-b of the ABC Law.74 Within Section 101-
b, there are requirements that both manufacturers and 
wholesalers file a monthly posting with the SLA that lists their 
products’ prices for the following pricing period.75 After the 
prices are filed, the SLA produces a composite for inspection, 
and there is a three-day window in which wholesalers may 
lower their prices to the lowest posted prices for the same 
products.76 After this window ends, the prices cannot be 
changed for the entire month without prior written permission 
from the SLA.77  
In light of current Twenty-first Amendment 
jurisprudence, Section 101-b’s mandate that prices must not be 
changed without the SLA’s permission (as opposed to being 
dependent on market forces) constitutes an unreasonable 
restraint of trade, thereby violating the Sherman Act.78 The 
Twenty-first Amendment may serve as a defense when a liquor 
law is challenged as preempted by the Sherman Act.79 
Therefore, the problems of Section 101-b should not be 
addressed without considering the Supreme Court’s approach 
to the Twenty-first Amendment and the regulatory powers it 
gave to the states regarding alcohol. This is especially true 
because of conflicting language in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.80  
  
 72 See Arnold’s Wines, 571 F.3d at 187-88 (citing various provisions of New 
York’s Alcohol Beverage Control Law); see also FTC REPORT, supra note 70, at 5-7. 
 73 See Arnold’s Wines, 571 F.3d at 187 n.1 (“With the exception of 
wineries, . . . all manufacturers’ products must pass through the three-tier system.”) 
(internal citations omitted).  
 74 See generally N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b. 
 75 Id. § 101-b(3)(a). 
 76 Id. § 101-b(4). The SLA also has the option to simply produce all filed price 
schedules for inspection, rather than creating a composite of them. Id. 
 77 Id. § 101-b(3)(b). 
 78 See supra Part I.B. 
 79 See infra note 120 and accompanying text.  
 80 See infra notes 89-95, 118 and accompanying text. 
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II. EVOLUTION OF TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Over time, the interpretation of the scope of power that 
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment gives the states has 
varied, especially regarding the “interplay between the 
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment.”81 Two 
main approaches to interpreting Section 2 have developed: the 
“absolutist” approach and the “federalist” approach.82 
Absolutists argue that the “plain language of the Twenty-first 
Amendment vests complete control of regulation over 
intoxicating liquor to the states.”83 Federalists, on the other 
hand, stress that the Twenty-first Amendment “does not vest 
in the states any new powers, but merely restores the status 
quo that existed prior to Prohibition.”84 The Supreme Court has 
evolved from an absolutist stance, which was highly deferential 
to state liquor laws at the expense of other federal laws, to an 
approach closer to the federalist view. Today, the Court 
examines these liquor laws in relation to pertinent federal 
laws.85 
A. Policy of Non-Interference 
The Twenty-first Amendment incited controversy not 
only from Prohibitionists, but also from those who believed that 
it conflicted with Congress’ power to regulate interstate 
commerce.86 Beginning in the late 1930s, the Supreme Court 
made it clear that it would take a deferential approach to state 
laws that invoked the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate 
  
 81 Duncan Baird Douglass, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the 
Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of 
Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1636-37 (2000). 
Douglass refers often to the intersection of the Twenty-first Amendment and the 
dormant Commerce Clause. See generally id. at 1624-38. However, as he points out, the 
dormant Commerce Clause is a negative implication of the affirmative powers that the 
Commerce Clause grants the states; they are therefore intertwined. Id. at 1624. For 
clarity and consistency, this note will refer to the Commerce Clause or commerce 
powers, rather than the dormant Commerce Clause. 
 82 Silvernail, supra note 3, at 513 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Douglass, supra note 81, at 1636-37. 
 86 See Norton, supra note 71, at 1471; compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
(“Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States”) 
with U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any State, 
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating 
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited” (emphasis added)). 
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alcoholic beverages.87 In a series of cases following the 
Amendment’s ratification, the Supreme Court solidly 
established its absolutist approach to interpretation, as it 
repeatedly found that state liquor laws were not constrained by 
other provisions of the Constitution.88  
The Supreme Court’s most extreme language regarding 
the extent of states’ power to control liquor can be found in 
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves.89 In Ziffrin, an Indiana corporation 
contracted with Kentucky distillers to receive whiskey and 
then ship it to Chicago.90 When Kentucky enacted a law 
prohibiting this type of arrangement and provided law 
enforcement with the authority to seize goods,91 the Indiana 
corporation claimed that the law was unconstitutional because 
it violated the Commerce Clause.92 In upholding the law, the 
Supreme Court explicitly held in favor of state regulation of 
liquor, stating “[t]he Twenty-first Amendment sanctions the 
right of a state to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors 
brought from without, unfettered by the Commerce Clause.” 
(emphasis added)93 With limited exceptions,94 the Court only 
  
 87 See Norton, supra note 71, at 1471. 
 88 See e.g., State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Market, 299 U.S. 59 (1936) 
(holding that state liquor laws are not limited by the Commerce or Equal Protection 
Clauses), adhered to by Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. 
Liquor Control Comm’n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 
401 (1938). Accord Douglass, supra note 81, at 1637-38; Spaeth, supra note 1, at 183-84. 
 89 308 U.S. 132 (1939). 
 90 Id. at 133. 
 91 Id. at 133-35. 
 92 Id. at 137. The Indiana corporation also argued the law violated the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Id. 
 93 Id. at 138 (emphasis added). 
 94 See Silvernail, supra note 3, at 517-19. Silvernail uses two cases that came 
about a decade after Young’s Market to illustrate his theory that the Court began to 
“introduc[e] chips into the foundation upon which the absolutist interpretation of the 
Twenty-first Amendment is constructed.” Id. at 519. First, Silvernail points to United 
States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945) as “the first case where the 
Supreme Court showed signs of reining in the broad sweeping powers it so readily 
bestowed upon the states in Young’s Market.” Silvernail, supra note 3, at 518. 
Frankfort Distilleries was the first time the Court stated that the powers given to the 
states by the Twenty-first Amendment are qualified by federal powers. Id.; see also 
Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293. Although the Court refused to ultimately decide 
whether the Sherman Act limits state powers enacted under the Twenty-first 
Amendment in an antitrust suit against Colorado liquor producers, wholesalers, and 
retailers, the Court stated: 
Granting the state’s full authority to determine the conditions upon which 
liquor can come into its territory and what will be done with it after it gets 
there, it does not follow from that fact that the United States is wholly 
without power to regulate the conduct of those who engage in interstate trade 
outside the jurisdiction of [the state whose law is at issue]. 
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began to “retreat[] substantially” from this approach to state 
liquor laws in the 1960s and 1970s.95 
B. Limiting the Scope of Section 2 
Upon brief review of the Supreme Court’s early Twenty-
first Amendment jurisprudence, one would think that the 
Supreme Court had forgotten the importance of the Commerce 
Clause.96 However, in the landmark case97 of Hostetter v. 
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,98 the Supreme Court finally 
used the Commerce Clause to strike down a New York liquor 
law that prohibited transportation of alcohol within state 
borders, because the shipments at issue were merely passing 
through New York for delivery and use in a foreign country.99 
The Court emphasized that New York was not trying to 
prevent alcohol from being unlawfully diverted for use within 
the state,100 perhaps indicating that the law would have been 
permissible had that been New York’s goal. In reaching its 
holding, the Court explained that “[b]oth the Twenty-first 
Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same 
Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, each 
must be considered in the light of the other, and in the context 
of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case.”101 This 
  
Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. at 299. The second case Silvernail uses to illustrate that 
the Court was “chip[ping] into” its absolutist foundation was Nippert v. City of 
Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946). Silvernail, supra note 3, at 518-19. In Nippert, which 
was not a “Twenty-first Amendment [case],” the Supreme Court reiterated the strength 
of the federal government’s commerce powers, citing Frankfort Distilleries for its 
proposition that “even the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the Twenty-
first Amendment gives the states the highest degree of control, is not altogether beyond 
the reach of the federal commerce power. . .” Nippert at 425 n.15. 
 95 See Douglass, supra note 81, at 1638; see also Norton, supra note 71, at 1472. 
 96 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 97 See Spaeth, supra note 1, at 185 (“The Court consummated its full retreat 
from earlier broad readings of [T]wenty-first [A]mendment power, in a pair of decisions 
handed down in 1964: Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. and Department. 
of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co.”). 
 98 377 U.S. 324 (1964). 
 99 Id. at 333-34. 
 100 Id. at 333. 
 101 Id. at 332. The Supreme Court also uttered the oft-repeated comment that  
To draw a conclusion from [early Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence 
after ratification] that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to 
“repeal” the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is 
concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. . . . Such a 
conclusion would be patently bizarre and is demonstrably incorrect. 
Id. at 331-32. 
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decision marked a notable shift in the Supreme Court’s 
approach to interpreting Section 2 of the Twenty-first 
Amendment. For the first time, the Court clearly asserted that 
the Commerce Clause could limit a state’s liquor laws.102 
After Hostetter, the Court continued its retreat from 
giving the states excessive discretion with respect to their 
liquor laws. For example, less than a decade later, the Court 
made clear that it would no longer give deference to state 
liquor laws at the expense of the Fourteenth Amendment.103 
These decisions paved the way for the Court to further restrict 
the over-broad scope it had originally given to Section 2. 
C. The Current Approach to Twenty-first Amendment 
Cases: The “Accommodation Doctrine”104  
Beginning in 1980, the Supreme Court began clearly 
articulating its new approach to overreaching state liquor 
regulations. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal 
Aluminum, Inc.,105 the Court held that Section 2 of the Twenty-
first Amendment did not save a California liquor law that 
violated the Sherman Act by imposing a resale price 
maintenance scheme on wholesale wine producers.106 The Court 
claimed that it was following early Twenty-first Amendment 
jurisprudence by acknowledging the extensive authority that 
the Amendment gave to the states to regulate liquor.107 
  
 102 Id.; see also Douglass, supra note 81, at 1638. 
 103 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (acknowledging again the 
states’ broad powers over liquor under the Twenty-first Amendment but refusing to 
uphold a liquor law that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1971) (holding that 
while the states were given a broad grant of power to regulate liquor by the Twenty-
first Amendment, a liquor law could not deprive a person of due process). The Court in 
Craig reaffirmed that “each provision [of the Constitution must] ‘be considered in the 
light of the other . . .’” Id. at 206 (quoting Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332); see also Silvernail, 
supra note 3, at 521. 
 104 The Court’s current approach of balancing state and federal interests when 
a state liquor regulation conflicts with a federal law that implicates the Commerce 
Power has come to be known as the “accommodation doctrine.” See Silvernail, supra 
note 3, at 524 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Elizabeth D. Lauzon, 
Annotation, Interplay Between Twenty-first Amendment and Commerce Clause 
Concerning State Regulation of Intoxicating Liquors, 116 A.L.R.5th 149 (2004). 
 105 445 U.S. 97 (1980). Midcal holds particular significance for this Note, as it 
provides the foundation for how to analyze whether a liquor law violates the Sherman 
Act and, if so, whether it is protected by the Twenty-first Amendment; therefore the 
case is relied upon by almost all of the subsequent cases on this issue. See infra Part 
III. 
 106 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 113-14. 
 107 Id. at 106-10. 
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Nonetheless, in stark contrast with those early cases, the Court 
refused to defer to a state law because it conflicted with a 
federal law enacted pursuant to the Commerce Power.108 In 
reaching its decision, the Court relied on Hostetter’s suggestion 
that examining state liquor laws may call for balancing the 
state’s interests with federal interests, but it went a step 
further by actually requiring this balancing approach “in 
appropriate situations.”109 
Taking an even larger step away from the early Twenty-
first Amendment jurisprudence, in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. 
Crisp,110 the Court expanded on both Hostetter and Midcal to set 
a new standard for state liquor regulations that conflict with 
federal laws.111 Capital Cities stands for the proposition that 
courts presented with such a regulation must ask “whether the 
interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related 
to the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that 
the regulation may prevail, notwithstanding that its 
requirements directly conflict with express federal policies.”112 
In other words, the test to determine whether a state liquor 
law that conflicts with a federal law is valid is to ask whether 
the state law at issue directly serves the purposes of the 
Twenty-first Amendment,113 and whether those interests 
outweigh the interests of the countervailing federal law.114 
In another notable opinion, Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. 
Dias,115 not only did the Court affirm this Capital Cities 
standard, but it was quite dismissive of the earlier Twenty-first 
Amendment cases, referring to the legislative history of the 
Twenty-first Amendment as “obscur[e].”116 Most shockingly, the 
Court declared, “[i]t is by now clear that the [Twenty-first] 
  
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 110 (“[T]here is no bright line between federal and state powers over 
liquor. . . . Although States retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor 
regulations, those controls may be subject to the federal commerce power in 
appropriate situations. The competing state and federal interests can be reconciled 
only after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a ‘concrete case.’”). 
 110 467 U.S. 691 (1984). 
 111 Id. at 711-14. 
 112 Id. at 714. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 110; see supra notes 109, 112 and accompanying text. 
 115 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
 116 See id. at 274 (“Despite broad language in some of the opinions of this 
Court written shortly after ratification of the Amendment, more recently we have 
recognized the obscurity of the legislative history of § 2.” (internal citations omitted)); 
see also Silvernail, supra note 3, at 525. 
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Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of 
alcoholic beverages from the ambit of the Commerce Clause.”117 
Such a statement directly contradicted the Court’s language in 
Ziffrin that state liquor laws are “unfettered by the Commerce 
Clause.”118 After Bacchus Imports, there could be no doubt that 
under the accommodation doctrine the Supreme Court would 
take a hard look at state liquor regulations that conflicted with 
federal laws.119 Still, knowing that a court will give rigorous 
scrutiny to New York’s post and hold statute is barely 
scratching the surface of the type of analysis required to 
determine the validity of Section 101-b.  
III. THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT VS. THE SHERMAN ACT: 
WHEN A LIQUOR LAW IS SUBJECT TO AN ANTITRUST 
CHALLENGE 
When a state’s liquor law is challenged on constitutional 
grounds, one of the most common reactions of that state is to 
use the Twenty-first Amendment as a defense.120 The same is 
true when a liquor law is challenged as being in violation of the 
Sherman Act.121 The Supreme Court will no longer give great 
deference to liquor laws that conflict with federal legislation, 
such as the Sherman Act, simply because the laws are claimed 
to have been enacted pursuant to the Twenty-first 
Amendment.122 As a result, courts faced with determining the 
validity of such a law must perform an analysis that involves 
wading through complex issues of antitrust law and assessing 
the legitimacy of states’ claimed interests in order to ultimately 
decide whether a state has proven that it can properly rely on 
the Twenty-first Amendment to shield a state law that conflicts 
with federal law.  
  
 117 Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 275. 
 118 Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939); see supra Part II.A. 
 119 See supra note 104. 
 120 See e.g., Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 
U.S. 97, 106 (1980); see also Lauzon, supra note 104 (explaining that under the 
accommodation doctrine, after a court finds that a state liquor regulation violates the 
Commerce Clause, the burden shifts to the state to show that the law at issue is saved 
by the Twenty-first Amendment). 
 121 See, e.g., Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106. 
 122 See supra Part II.C. 
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A. Assessing the Validity of Liquor Laws Challenged as 
Violations of the Sherman Act 
Section 101-b is a state liquor law and should be treated 
as other state liquor laws that have run up against the 
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court laid the foundation for an 
intricate three-part sequential test to determine whether a 
state’s liquor regulation may be sustained when challenged as 
a violation of the Sherman Act.123 First, a court must determine 
whether the regulation is preempted by the Sherman Act.124 If 
the law does not violate the Sherman Act, then the challenger 
will clearly lose because the law has antitrust immunity.125 
However, if the court finds that the liquor regulation does 
indeed violate the Sherman Act, it must perform the second 
step of the three-part analysis and determine whether the law 
has antitrust immunity under the state-action doctrine.126 The 
law will be sustained if the court finds that it has antitrust 
immunity.127 If not, the third step in the analysis is to 
determine whether Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment 
will serve as a valid defense and save the law.128 Each step in 
this three-part test is broken down further, and while the 
Supreme Court has yet to give clear guidance for how to apply 
the test in a given case, the federal courts have developed and 
applied this test to many state liquor regulations challenged on 
the grounds of violating the Sherman Act.129 
  
 123 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 102-06. 
 124 Id. at 102. In striking down a California liquor regulation, the Supreme 
Court noted “[t]he threshold question is whether [the liquor regulation] . . . violates the 
Sherman Act.” Id. 
 125 Id. at 102-03. For example, a unilateral restraint is not preempted by the 
Sherman Act, or in other words, has antitrust immunity. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 126 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 103 (after finding that California’s wine pricing scheme 
violated the Sherman Act, the Court then considered whether it was immune); Parker 
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 368 (1943). The state-action doctrine is essentially a two-part 
test to determine whether the challenged liquor law should be treated as “state action,” 
and thus immune from the Sherman Act, despite the fact that private actors are 
involved in the law’s enforcement. See infra Part III.A.2. The doctrine is intended to 
address the tension between serving the federal interests of the Sherman Act, e.g. 
promoting competition, and the rights of the states as sovereign entities. See infra Part 
III.A.2. 
 127 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 128 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106 (turning to an analysis of whether the Twenty-first 
Amendment served as a basis for upholding the challenged law after finding the law 
conflicted with the Sherman Act and had no antitrust immunity). 
 129 See infra Part III.B. 
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1. Step One: Whether a State Liquor Law Is Preempted 
by the Sherman Act 
As a threshold issue, a court must look at the challenged 
law to determine whether it conflicts with the Sherman Act.130 
Even this threshold issue is complex, requiring its own 
sequential two-step analysis.131 Assume that the challenged law 
is a restraint of trade, in that it hampers free competition.132 As 
discussed above, the Sherman Act prohibits agreements to 
engage in unreasonable restraints of trade.133 Therefore, a court 
must determine two things: (1) whether the required element 
of agreement has been met; and (2) whether the restraint is 
unreasonable. Whether the first element, a finding of 
agreement, will be satisfied largely depends on whether the 
challenged law may be classified as a unilateral134 or a hybrid135 
restraint.136 If the restraint is deemed unilateral, then the law 
has antitrust immunity because it is a sovereign act by the 
state that the Sherman Act was not intended to prohibit.137 If, 
however, the law is deemed a hybrid restraint, the court will 
proceed to the second step in the analysis: determining 
whether the restraint actually violates the Sherman Act.138 
Thus, applying the rule to Section 101-b, the two-step test for 
whether it conflicts with the Sherman Act consists of asking (1) 
  
 130 Midcal 445 U.S. at 102. 
 131 See TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 207 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 132 See supra note 54 (defining restraint of trade). 
 133 See supra Part I.B. 
 134 A unilateral restraint is typically a state law, or governmental action, that 
forces private individuals to engage in anticompetitive behavior simply by complying 
with the law; there is no agreement among the individuals. See infra Part.III.A.1.a; see 
also Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1986) (finding a rent control 
ordinance to be a unilateral restraint and noting that the landlords whose prices were 
restricted by the ordinance had made no agreement to put a ceiling on rent prices); 
Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 273; A unilateral restraint is in direct contrast with 
a private restraint, in which private individuals agree to restrain trade, and there is no 
related governmental regulation shaping their behavior. See id. at 284-85. 
 135 A hybrid restraint is not easily defined, but as a general matter involves a 
state regulation in which private individuals have some discretion as to whether they 
will comply with the regulation in a way that consists of anticompetitive behavior that 
would violate the Sherman Act, if not immune. See infra Part.III.A.1.a. In other words, 
hybrid restraints involve a mixture of government and private action. See Lopatka & 
Page, supra note 54, at 287. 
 136 See TFWS, Inc., 242 F.3d at 207 (describing this step in the analysis); see 
also Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 284-85. 
 137 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943). The Sherman Act was 
intended to sanction private parties that agree to restrain trade, not to prevent states 
from taking affirmative action to regulate commerce. Id. 
 138 See TFWS, Inc., 242 F.3d at 207. 
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whether Section 101-b is a unilateral or hybrid restraint in 
order to find whether the element of agreement has been 
satisfied; and (2) if Section 101-b is a hybrid restraint, whether 
it constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
a. Step 1(a): Is There an Agreement? 
The Sherman Act expresses the concept of agreement as 
a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy.”139 However, as 
scholars have noted, “the meaning of agreement is . . . 
notoriously complex.”140 Indeed, it has been argued that the 
term’s meaning varies depending on whether a restraint is 
characterized as unilateral or hybrid.141 Since unilateral 
restraints are automatically immune from preemption by the 
Sherman Act,142 the determination of whether a restraint is 
unilateral or hybrid may effectively result in the invalidation of 
a law.143 Therefore, attempting to draw a line between the two 
categories is critical. 
The distinction between unilateral and hybrid restraints 
of trade is not always clearly articulated by the courts.144 What 
can be gleaned from the cases is that the less discretion private 
individuals have in affecting competition by complying with the 
law, the more likely it is that a court will find the law to be a 
unilateral restraint.145 In contrast, the more discretion private 
market participants are given by the law, the more likely it is 
that a court will deem the law a hybrid restraint.146 In other 
words, the restraint’s classification turns on the issue of 
control. 
  
 139 15 U.S.C. § 1; Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 271.  
 140 Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 288 (“[Agreement] is a term of art whose 
peculiar contours vary with the Court’s understanding of a particular restraint’s likely 
competitive effects.”). 
 141 See id. at 297 (“[T]he definition of agreement in the context of hybrid 
restraints differs from the definition of agreement in the contexts of private restraints 
and purely governmental restraints.”). 
 142 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 143 Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 272. 
 144 See id. at 269 (stating “the Supreme Court’s precedents are not entirely 
consistent” in distinguishing between unilateral and hybrid restraints). 
 145 Id. at 283-84. 
 146 Looking forward briefly, a hybrid restraint of trade that conflicts with the 
Sherman Act may fail to qualify as immune under the state action doctrine. There are 
several steps before declaring that a challenged law is not immune. However, a law 
deemed to be a unilateral restraint escapes the lengthy scrutiny that a hybrid restraint 
will receive, especially if that hybrid restraint is deemed a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.  
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While unilateral restraints take away private control 
over competitive decision-making, hybrid restraints allow 
private individuals to retain at least some degree of control. For 
example, in Fisher v. City of Berkeley, the Supreme Court 
declared that Berkeley’s Rent Control Ordinance setting 
maximum rent prices that landlords could charge was a 
unilateral restraint because the Ordinance removed price-
setting control from the landlords and gave it to the City.147 The 
Court went on to characterize hybrid restraints as using 
“nonmarket mechanisms [to] merely enforce private marketing 
decisions,” stating that “the regulatory scheme may be attacked” 
when “private actors” are given “a degree of private regulatory 
power.”148 The Fisher Court took the concept of “hybrid 
restraints” from a concurrence in an earlier case;149 the Court 
then used two cases to illustrate the concept.150 Although the 
opinions in those cases did not reference hybrid restraints, they 
nonetheless serve as guidance since the Court has clearly 
pointed to them (albeit ex post) as examples of hybrid restraints.  
First, the Court in Fisher pointed to Schwegmann Bros. 
v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,151 in which the Court had struck 
down a Louisiana statute authorizing distributors to enter 
resale price contracts with retailers selling their products and 
to enforce those price-fixing agreements against not only those 
retailers, but other retailers selling the distributors’ products 
who were not party to the price-fixing agreement.152 The Court 
  
 147 Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 269 (1986) (stating the Ordinance 
“place[d] complete control over maximum rent levels exclusively in the hands of the 
Rent Stabilization Board. Not just the controls themselves but also the rent ceilings 
they mandate have been unilaterally imposed on the landlords by the city.”). Similarly, 
the First Circuit compared a Massachusetts law limiting liquor storeowners to a 
maximum of three liquor store licenses to the Rent Control Ordinance in Fisher, 
because it did not give any control over competitive decision-making to private 
individuals. See Mass. Food Ass’n v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 197 
F.3d 560, 565-66 (1st Cir. 1999) (in finding that the law at issue was not preempted by 
the Sherman Act, the court stated “[t]he Massachusetts statute . . . does not authorize 
or direct any private agreements or permit any competitor to determine the price or 
location of another. . . . As in Fisher, the restrictions have been ‘unilaterally imposed by 
government . . . to the exclusion of private control.’” (quoting Fisher, 475 U.S. at 266)). 
 148 Fisher, 475 U.S. at 267-68 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 149 Id. (citing Rice v. Norman Williams, 458 U.S. 654, 665 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). 
 150 See Fisher, 475 U.S. at 268. 
 151 341 U.S. 384 (1951). 
 152 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951). At 
the time this Louisiana statute was in effect, the Miller-Tydings Act amended Section 1 
of the Sherman Act to allow agreements setting minimum resale prices for certain 
commodities in intrastate transactions; that Act is now repealed. 15 U.S.C. § 1, 
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in Fisher distinguished the Rent Control Ordinance, pursuant 
to which Berkeley set maximum rents, from the Louisiana law 
that allowed the distributers to set minimum resale prices, 
thus leaving some control in the hands of private individuals.153 
Next, the Fisher Court referred to Midcal.154 According to the 
Fisher Court, the resale price maintenance scheme in Midcal 
was a hybrid restraint because “[t]he trade restraint 
condemned in Midcal entailed a similar degree of free 
participation by private economic actors.”155  
Even if Schwegmann Bros. and Midcal were not decided 
based on the concept of “hybrid restraints,” the Supreme Court 
has come to rely on them as examples of the concept, stressing 
that each case turned on the fact that private individuals had 
discretion to affect competition, and their decisions would be 
enforced by the state.156 In particular, both Schwegmann Bros. 
and Midcal dealt with price restraints, and the Fisher Court 
stressed the importance of the fact that the private market 
participants were the ones setting prices rather than the state, 
which merely enforced them.157 This seems to indicate that where 
a law authorizes price restraints, and the state does not set the 
prices itself as it did in Fisher, it is especially prone to being 
characterized as a hybrid restraint. Assuming that the 
challenged law is found to be a hybrid restraint, the element of 
agreement has been satisfied and the next step in the analysis is 
to assess whether the restraint is a violation of the Sherman Act.158 
b. Step 1(b): Is There a Violation of the Sherman 
Act? 
As noted above, the Sherman Act only prohibits 
unreasonable restraints of trade.159 Of course, a state would 
  
Amendments (showing enactment of 50 Stat. 693 (1937), and its repeal, 89 Stat. 801 
(1975)).  
 153 See Fisher, 475 U.S. at 268-69. 
 154 See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.  
 155 Fisher, 475 U.S. at 268. 
 156  See, e.g., id.  
 157 Id. at 268-69. 
 158 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. It may seem counterintuitive, if 
not unjust, to find an illegal agreement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act where 
individuals are complying with a state liquor law without actually agreeing to restrain 
trade. However, the Supreme Court has affirmatively stated that a violation of the 
Sherman Act may be found in the absence of private agreement if the state compels 
activity that would otherwise be a per se violation. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 
335, 345 (1987). 
 159 See supra Part I.B. 
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prefer that a law be deemed a unilateral restraint and therefore 
not subject to Sherman Act preemption.160 Even if the restraint is 
hybrid, though, the state will still have the opportunity to show 
that the restraint is not unreasonable.161 Post and hold statutes, 
like other price restraints, have generally been treated as per se 
violations.162 A state statute is a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act if it “mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily 
constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it 
places irresistible pressure on a private party to violate the 
antitrust laws in order to comply with the statute.”163 If, as in the 
cases involving “post and hold” statutes, the restraint does 
violate the Sherman Act,164 the court must then determine 
whether the law is immune under the state-action doctrine 
espoused by Parker v. Brown.165 Considering the treatment of 
other post and hold liquor laws,166 Section 101-b should certainly 
reach this level of analysis. 
2. Step Two: State-Action Doctrine 
Assuming that Section 101-b of the ABC Law is deemed 
a hybrid price restraint that violates the Sherman Act, New 
York would certainly argue that it is entitled to antitrust 
immunity under the state-action doctrine. The state-action 
doctrine originated in Parker, where the Supreme Court 
pointed out that the Sherman Act was not intended to prohibit 
the states from taking affirmative action that restrains 
competition.167 Unilateral restraints are not subject to the 
scrutiny that hybrid restraints receive because unilateral 
restraints qualify as this type of affirmative state action.168 
Although hybrid restraints do not automatically qualify for 
  
 160 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 161 See supra Part I.B. Determining whether a restraint violates the Sherman 
Act is typically fact-specific, but it can be superficially described as two basic 
approaches. While some restraints of trade are per se unreasonable, and thus in 
conflict with the Sherman Act without further analysis, other restraints are assessed 
under the “rule of reason,” which essentially consists of determining whether a 
restraint is reasonable in light of the circumstances. See id. 
 162 See infra Part III.B. 
 163 Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982). 
 164 See infra Part III.B. 
 165 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (finding California’s regulation of the state’s 1940 
raisin crop to be proper regulation of state industry not interfering with federal 
commerce powers). 
 166 See infra Part III.B. 
 167 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).  
 168 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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such immunity, the Supreme Court in Midcal held that a 
hybrid restraint will be immune from the Sherman Act under 
Parker’s state-action doctrine if it satisfies two requirements.169 
First, the restraint must be “clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed as state policy.”170 Second, the restraint 
must be “actively supervised by the State itself.”171  
a. Step 2(a): Is the Restraint Clearly Articulated 
and Affirmatively Expressed as State Policy? 
The first hurdle of Midcal, i.e., whether the state has 
“clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed [the restraint] 
as state policy,” has typically been overcome.172 This makes 
sense considering that the state does not have to do much to 
satisfy the standard. For example, in Midcal, the Court said 
that the California wine-pricing scheme (already deemed a 
hybrid restraint) satisfied the first prong of the immunity test 
because “[t]he legislative policy [was] forthrightly stated and 
clear in its purpose to permit resale price maintenance.”173 So 
long as the legislature makes its intent to displace competition 
clear, the first prong will most likely be satisfied.174 
b. Step 2(b): Is the Restraint Actively Supervised 
by the State Itself? 
It is the second Midcal prong that has more often 
prevented a challenged restraint from establishing immunity.175 
In Midcal, the Supreme Court struck down California’s wine-
pricing scheme because it was not actively supervised by the 
  
 169 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 
105 (1980). 
 170 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 171 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 172 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Costco Wholesale 
Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 902 (9th Cir. 2008); TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 
198, 210-11 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 173 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105. 
 174 But see Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 230 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(finding that New York’s Contraband Statutes failed prong one of Midcal because the 
state’s articulated interest in using them as a method of revenue production was not 
legitimate); infra notes 286-288 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has not 
spoken on the issue, but if the Second Circuit’s approach is correct, then a clearly 
stated intent to displace competition may nonetheless fail to satisfy Midcal’s first 
prong if the court finds the policy behind the intent illegitimate. 
 175 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06; see Costco Wholesale Corp. 522 F.3d at 902-03; 
TFWS, Inc., 242 F.3d at 210-11. 
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state, stating in a frequently-quoted phrase that “[t]he State 
neither establishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the 
price schedules . . . . [t]he State does not monitor market 
conditions or engage in any ‘pointed reexamination’ of the 
program.”176 In striking down New York ABC Law § 101-bb, a 
“markup” statute, the Court similarly found a lack of active 
supervision.177 Rather, “[t]he State ha[d] displaced competition 
among liquor retailers without substituting an adequate 
system of regulation.”178 The Supreme Court seems to have 
established two ways for a state to protect an anticompetitive 
liquor regulation. If the regulation allows private individuals to 
set prices, i.e., gives private individuals discretion or control 
over prices, the state must have a system in place to ensure 
that these prices are reasonable.179 Alternatively, the 
consequences of allowing individuals to set prices must be 
reasonable.180 If the state is unable to show reasonableness, the 
restraint will not be immune, and the state must then rely on 
the Twenty-first Amendment’s grant of power for redemption. 
3. Step Three: The Twenty-first Amendment Defense 
After a state law is deemed a hybrid restraint and fails 
to obtain antitrust immunity, the Twenty-first Amendment is 
the final obstacle to invalidation,181 or in other words, Section 
101-b’s last resort for protection. The courts have developed yet 
another two-part test for determining whether the Twenty-first 
  
 176 Midcal, 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980) (after finding the scheme to be a hybrid 
restraint preempted by the Sherman Act). See, e.g., Costco Wholesale Corp., 522 F.3d at 
889 (quoting Midcal); Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344, 1351 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting 
Midcal).  
 177 New York ABC Law section 101-bb required retailers to “markup” the 
“posted” wholesale price for liquor by 112 percent (but allowed wholesalers to sell to 
retailers at less than the “posted” price). 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 335, 
337 (1987). 
 178 Id. at 344-45. 
 179 See, e.g., 324 Liquor, 479 U.S. at 344-45; Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06. 
 180 The Court has indicated that it is worried about state authorization of 
private price-fixing that essentially fosters cartelization, with no check on the 
individual market participants’ power. See 324 Liquor, 479 U.S at 342 (discussing the 
possibility that “industrywide resale price maintenance . . . may facilitate 
cartelization”); Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106 (“The national policy in favor of competition 
cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is 
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.”). While the Court expresses its 
concerns, it does not elaborate as to what kinds of consequences would be considered 
reasonable, and neither do the federal courts applying the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area. 
 181 See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106. 
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Amendment serves as a valid defense to a restraint that 
violates the Sherman Act.182 First, the restraint must be 
intended to serve a legitimate state policy.183 Second, the state 
must show that the restraint “substantiates” that policy.184 At 
this point, under the accommodation approach,185 the Twenty-
first Amendment will only protect a challenged restraint if it 
directly serves the policies of the Amendment and those 
policies outweigh the goals of the Sherman Act.186 If the 
restraint can pass this final test, it will have survived its 
antitrust challenge.187 
a. Step 3(a): Was the Restraint Intended to Serve 
a Legitimate State Policy? 
Even if Section 101-b purports to serve legitimate state 
concerns, it will not necessarily be saved by the Twenty-first 
Amendment. In essence, there must be a balancing of a state’s 
legitimate interests and the federal interest in the Sherman 
Act.188 For example, in Bacchus Imports, the Supreme Court 
refused to uphold a discriminatory state liquor tax because it 
“was [not] designed to promote temperance or carry out any 
other purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment.”189 While 
Bacchus involved a challenge based on discrimination in 
violation of the Commerce Clause as opposed to an antitrust 
challenge, it is the clearest statement of the type of reasoning 
that has been applied in the liquor antitrust cases.190 
Specifically, if a state liquor law does not promote the goals of 
the Twenty-first Amendment, it will be invalidated. 
  
 182 Both prongs must be satisfied for the restraint to survive an antitrust 
challenge. Id. at 113-14. 
 183 See id. 
 184 Id. The word “substantiate” appears to be used as a term of art by the 
Supreme Court and the federal courts to assess whether the restraint at issue 
effectuates the policy asserted in support of it. For consistency, this Note will use this 
term as well with the same intended meaning. 
 185 See supra Part II.C. 
 186 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. The goals of the Sherman Act 
are fairness among producers, economic efficiency, and consumer welfare. See supra 
note 53 and accompanying text. 
 187 See supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text. 
 188 See, e.g., Midcal, 445 U.S. at 108-14. 
 189 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984); see Douglass, 
supra note 81, at 1641-42. 
 190 See, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 347-49 (1987); Midcal, 
445 U.S. at 113-14.  
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Therefore, in order to serve a legitimate state policy, the 
restraint must be based on a concern that relates directly to 
the Twenty-first Amendment, and that concern must outweigh 
the federal interests served by the Sherman Act.191 So far, 
legitimate state interests have included temperance and 
protecting small retailers.192 Economic protectionism is an 
example of a state interest that is not legitimate because it is 
not a “core concern[]” of the Twenty-first Amendment.193 The 
fact that a restraint purports to serve legitimate state 
interests, however, will not be enough to save the restraint if it 
is not effectively serving those interests.194 
b. Step 3(b): Does the Restraint Substantiate the 
State’s Legitimate Concerns? 
If a court finds that Section 101-b serves clearly 
articulated interests that are expressed as state policies, and 
those interests outweigh the interests of the Sherman Act, the 
court will have one final inquiry before it may declare Section 
101-b valid. The Supreme Court has held that “unsubstantiated 
state concerns . . . simply are not of the same stature as the 
goals of the Sherman Act.”195 Courts have repeatedly struck 
down restraints that were put into place to serve legitimate 
interests for failing to actually promote these interests.196 For 
example, in 324 Liquor Corp v. Duffy,197 the Court 
acknowledged the legitimacy of New York’s desire to protect 
small retail establishments, but struck down the state’s 
“markup” statute because the state failed to show that the 
restraint helped those retailers.198 The Court went even further 
than this, however, by pointing out that the Midcal Court had 
cited evidence showing that other states with similar laws had 
experienced increased failure of firms and decreased growth of 
small retail establishments.199 While the Supreme Court has not 
stated a clear rule for when an interest is substantiated, it has 
  
 191 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 192 See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 113-14. 
 193 Lauzon, supra note 104. 
 194 See Midcal 445 U.S. at 113. 
 195 Id. (emphasis added). 
 196 See, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. 335, 350 (1987); Midcal, 445 U.S. at 
113-14. 
 197 479 U.S. 335 (1987). 
 198 Id. at 350. 
 199 Id. 
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clearly shown that it is willing to not only require empirical 
evidence from the state but that it will also look at evidence to 
the contrary.200 This type of approach is a far cry from the 
original deference applied to state liquor laws.201 
B. Post and Hold Cases Challenged as Violations of the 
Sherman Act 
There have been several “post and hold” cases in the 
federal courts since the Supreme Court’s decision in Midcal, 
which can be considered the most instructive case for analyzing 
whether a liquor law that is challenged as preempted by the 
Sherman Act may be saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. 
With one exception, each time a federal circuit has considered the 
validity of a post and hold law, it has found that it was preempted 
by the Sherman Act,202 did not qualify for antitrust immunity 
under Parker,203 and was not saved by the Twenty-first 
Amendment because the law’s purported goals were not 
substantiated.204 These cases illustrate the analysis outlined above 
and are indicative of how a court will treat ABC Law Section 101-b. 
Each of the cases discussed in this section involved 
restraints considered “post and hold” laws, like ABC Law 
Section 101-b.205 The only case in which a federal circuit upheld 
a challenged post and hold restraint was Battipaglia v. New 
York State Liquor Authority,206 decided twenty-four years ago. 
The challenged restraint addressed by the Second Circuit in 
Battipaglia was none other than ABC Law Section 101-b.207 The 
majority held that Section 101-b did not violate the Sherman 
Act, and alternatively that if it did violate the Sherman Act, it 
was entitled to prevail because of the Twenty-first 
  
 200 Id. 
 201 See supra Part II.A. 
 202 See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 895-96 (9th Cir. 
2008); TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 209-10 (4th Cir. 2001); Miller v. Hedlund, 
813 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 203 See TFWS, Inc., 242 F.3d at 211; Miller, 813 F.2d at 1351-52; see infra 
notes 254-255 and accompanying text. 
 204 See infra notes 256-259 and accompanying text. Two of the cases, Miller v. 
Hedlund and TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer were remanded on this issue and in both 
instances, the post and hold laws ultimately were struck down for failing to 
substantiate the states’ interests. See infra notes 229-233, 243-247 and accompanying 
text.  
 205 See supra Part I.C. for a reminder of what Section 101-b requires. 
 206 745 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 207 Id. at 167. 
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Amendment.208 First, the court distinguished Midcal, claiming 
that Midcal involved a “resale price maintenance” scheme in 
which wine producers could dictate prices charged by 
downstream sellers,209 and thus was not dispositive because 
New York “merely requires wholesalers to post and adhere to 
their own unilaterally determined prices and nothing more.”210 
The majority noted that courts had disagreed over whether 
compliance with a state law could be grounds for the finding of 
“agreement” as required by the Sherman Act, but declined to 
choose a side.211 Instead, the court held that there was no 
preemption because this was a facial attack, which required 
proof that Section 101-b was a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act in all instances.212 Section 101-b was characterized as the 
“exchange of specific information,” an activity that should be 
subject to the rule of reason213 antitrust analysis, rather than be 
deemed a per se violation.214 The majority then found that even 
if Section 101-b violated the Sherman Act, it should prevail 
anyway because it was intended to serve a strong state interest 
in preventing price discrimination, and the state had not 
intended to reduce competition.215 
In response to the majority in Battipaglia, Judge Winter, 
in dissent, argued that Section 101-b is a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act. Under Judge Winter’s analysis, not only does 
Section 101-b contemplate the exchange of price information, 
but it also requires adherence to publicly announced prices, 
which was always held to be illegal irrespective of 
reasonableness.216 Judge Winter then went on to opine that the 
element of “agreement” should be found because Midcal does 
  
 208 Id. at 170. The majority declined to answer whether Section 101-b would 
be immune under the state-action doctrine. Id. 
 209 Id. at 172; see also supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 210 Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 172. 
 211 Id. at 173 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the court 
commented that “state compulsion of individual action is the very antithesis of an 
agreement.” Id. 
 212 Id. at 174-75. 
 213 See supra note 66 (explaining that not all anticompetitive activity results 
in a per se violation of the Sherman Act).  
 214 Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 175. 
 215 Id. at 178-79. The court noted that Section 101-b could create disincentives 
to reducing prices, but that the plaintiffs challenging the law had not argued this or 
provided any evidence that it was occurring. Id. at 178. 
 216 Id. at 179 (Winter, J., dissenting). 
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apply to Section 101-b, contrary to what the majority reasoned.217 
After determining that Section 101-b was thus preempted by the 
Sherman Act, Judge Winter found that while the intentions of 
New York were clearly stated and affirmatively expressed, as 
required by Midcal’s first prong, Section 101-b was not immune 
under the state-action doctrine because New York does not 
actively supervise whether Section 101-b carries out its intended 
policies.218 In concluding, Judge Winter commented that 
temperance would be a valid interest under the Twenty-first 
Amendment but that the Amendment should not apply in the 
case before the court because, in his opinion, the law was 
intended to allow liquor dealers to “seek out their profit-
maximizing price/output level[s].”219 Accordingly, he did not 
address whether Section 101-b substantiated the state’s 
purported interest in preventing price discrimination.220 
A few years after Battipaglia came Miller v. Hedlund,221 
in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that several 
features of Oregon’s liquor distribution regime violated the 
Sherman Act.222 The problematic provisions included: a 
requirement to post future prices at least ten days before the 
prices were to go into effect, a requirement that permissible 
price decreases remain in effect for a specified period, and a 
requirement that the posted price not be increased because of 
transportation costs.223 In essence, this was a post and hold 
regime because of the requirements to post resale prices in 
advance and adhere to those prices. In considering whether the 
regulations violated the Sherman Act, the court relied on 
Schwegmann and Midcal to find that they constituted hybrid 
restraints.224 After determining that they were also per se 
violations of the Act because “[a]n agreement to adhere to 
  
 217 Id. In essence, Judge Winter determined that this was a hybrid restraint, 
although he did not use the language. See id. (explaining that Section 101-b 
contemplated a combination of state and private action).  
 218 Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 180 (Winter, J., dissenting). Judge Winter stated 
that New York does not set the prices, review them for reasonableness, monitor the 
liquor industry’s market conditions, or review the scheme. Id. He quoted Midcal: “the 
national policy in favor of competition is thwarted by casting a . . . gauzy cloak of state 
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing agreement.” Id. (quoting 
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980)). 
 219 Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 180 (Winter, J., dissenting). 
 220 Id.  
 221 813 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1987).  
 222 Id. at 1351. 
 223 Id. at 1347. Oregon’s ban on volume discounts was also challenged, but not 
at issue on appeal. Id. at 1348 n.3. 
 224 Miller, 813 F.2d at 1350-51. 
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previously announced prices . . . is unlawful per se under the 
Sherman Act,”225 the court proceeded to apply the test for 
Parker’s state-action immunity.226 Again, the court relied on 
Midcal and denied immunity to the regulations, stating that 
Oregon failed to actively supervise them.227 Specifically, the 
court noted that Oregon neither set the prices nor determined 
their reasonableness.228 Finally, the court considered the state’s 
Twenty-first Amendment defense, stressed the importance of 
balancing the state’s claimed interests served by these 
regulations against the Sherman Act’s interests in fostering 
competition, and ultimately remanded because the factual 
record had not been developed on this issue.229  
In the case’s conclusion, the District Court of Oregon 
assessed the state’s purported interests in the price posting 
regime, asking whether the regime in fact substantiated those 
interests.230 Oregon argued that its intent was to prevent price 
discrimination.231 However, the court found that there was no 
evidence that price posting helped the state identify instances 
of price discrimination; instead, the court found that the price 
posting laws “authoriz[ed], facilitat[ed], and induc[ed] 
horizontal price fixing.”232 Consequently, Oregon was enjoined 
from enforcing its post and hold laws since they were not 
shielded by the Twenty-first Amendment.233 
About a decade later, another post and hold case was 
decided, this time in Maryland. In TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer,234 the 
owner of a large retail liquor store in Maryland sued the State 
Comptroller on the grounds that the state’s liquor regulatory 
scheme, which required liquor wholesalers to file price 
schedules with the state and adhere to those prices for at least 
  
 225 Id. at 1349. The Supreme Court held in 324 Liquor that a per se violation 
may be found in the absence of a private agreement if the state compels activity that 
would be a per se violation. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1987). In 
other words, the concept of agreement is treated differently for hybrid restraints in 
that the individuals complying with the law do not actually have to agree to fix prices 
in the normal sense of the word “agree.” See supra note 141; see generally supra Part 
III.A.1.a. 
 226 Miller, 813 F.2d at 1351-52.  
 227 Id. at 1351-52. 
 228 Id. at 1351-52 n.6. 
 229 Id. at 1352. 
 230 See generally Miller v. Hedlund, 717 F. Supp. 711 (D. Or. 1989). 
 231 Id. at 712. 
 232 Id. at 715-16.  
 233 Id. at 716. 
 234 242 F.3d 198 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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a month after posting, violated the Sherman Act.235 The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals first declared that “[t]he post-and-hold 
system is a classic hybrid restraint”236 because it requires 
private parties (wholesalers) to set prices, which are not 
reviewed for reasonableness, thus giving those parties a great 
deal of “private regulatory power.”237 Next, the court relied on 
Miller’s analysis to hold that the law was a per se violation of 
the Sherman Act.238 The court explained that the post and hold 
regime “mandate[d] activity that is essentially a form of 
horizontal price fixing, which has been called ‘the paradigm of 
an unreasonable restraint of trade.’”239 Maryland, like Oregon, 
was unable to establish state-action immunity for the post and 
hold laws, with the court relying on Midcal240 and 324 Liquor241 
to explain that the state failed to set prices, review the 
privately-set prices for reasonableness, monitor market 
conditions in the liquor industry, or “engage in any ‘pointed 
reexamination’ of the [post and hold regime].”242 
With respect to Maryland’s Twenty-first Amendment 
defense, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to develop the 
record, in order to determine whether the post and hold pricing 
scheme substantiated Maryland’s avowed interest in promoting 
  
 235 Id. at 201-02. Also at issue in the case was a ban on volume discounts, 
which the Court struck down. See id. at 202, 210. New York law also bans volume 
discounts, N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b(2)(a), and it is reasonable to believe that 
this would be struck down as well, based on the reasoning that applies to the post and 
hold law. See infra note 237. 
 236 TFWS Inc., 242 F.3d at 208. 
 237 Id. at 208-09. The Court also noted that “[t]he volume discount ban is a 
part of the hybrid restraint because it reinforces the post-and-hold system by making it 
even more inflexible.” Id. at 209. The court later went on to hold that the volume 
discount ban was also a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 210. 
 238 Id. at 209-10. The Court commented that “[s]everal district courts have 
reached the same result,” citing Beer & Pop Warehouse v. Jones, 41 F. Supp. 2d 552, 
560-62 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (“holding that Pennsylvania post-and-hold pricing statute for 
beer was a per se violation of the Sherman Act”) and Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v. 
Sullivan, 16 F. Supp. 2d 41, 47-48 (D. Mass. 1998) (“holding that Massachusetts post-
and-hold liquor pricing scheme was a per se violation of § 1 [of the Sherman Act]”). Id. 
at 210. The court acknowledged Battipaglia’s approach, see supra notes 206-215 and 
accompanying text, and then declined to follow, saying that no other court has followed 
it and a “leading commentator on antitrust law” had agreed with Judge Winter. TFWS 
Inc., 242 F.3d at 210; supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 239 TFWS, 242 F.3d at 209 (quoting N.C.A.A. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984)). 
 240 See supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text. 
 241 See supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text. 
 242 TFWS, Inc., 242 F.3d at 211 (internal citation omitted) (quoting 324 Liquor 
Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1987)). 
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temperance.243 The case went through several stages in both the 
district court and back up to the Fourth Circuit before it was 
finally resolved in 2007, in favor of TFWS (the liquor 
storeowner).244 After extensive evidentiary findings (and 
disputes) involving expert testimony on both theoretical and 
empirical studies245 the district court determined that the 
state’s evidence that the scheme promoted temperance was 
tenuous, and thus outweighed by the federal interest in 
fostering competition.246 In other words, Maryland was unable 
to save its post and hold laws because although it had a valid 
interest in promoting temperance, that interest was not 
substantiated, as required by Midcal and 324 Liquor.247 
The most recent federal decision to find that a post and 
hold law violated the Sherman Act was in the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, this time addressing a Washington law in 
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng.248 Washington had a post and 
hold system similar to both Oregon and Maryland, in that 
wholesalers were required to file prices and adhere to them for 
a specified period after they went into effect.249 The Costco 
court’s analysis was not as clear as that of Miller or TFWS. For 
example, it appeared that the court wanted to collapse the 
inquiry of whether the post and hold law was a hybrid restraint 
with the inquiry of whether the post and hold system was 
actively supervised by the state for purposes of antitrust 
immunity under the state action doctrine.250 While the Costco 
court questioned the clarity of the unilateral-hybrid restraint 
versus an active supervision analysis, it ultimately followed the 
approach of Miller and TFWS, first concluding that the law 
  
 243 See TFWS, Inc., 242 F.3d at 212-13. The court acknowledged that 
temperance is an interest contemplated by the Twenty-first Amendment. Id. at 213. 
 244 See TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, No. WDQ-99-2008, 2007 WL 2917025, at *10 
(D. Md. Sept. 27, 2007). 
 245 See, e.g., TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 183 F. Supp. 2d 789, 791-94 (D. Md. 
2002); TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 315 F. Supp. 2d 783, 783-84 & n. 1 (D. Md. 2004); 
TFWS, Inc. 2007 WL 2917025, at *2-8. 
 246 TFWS, Inc., 2007 WL 2917025, at *10.  
 247 See supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text. 
 248 522 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 249 See id. at 883; see supra note 223 and accompanying text; see supra note 
235 and accompanying text. 
 250 See Costco, 522 F.3d at 887-88. The court was fairly reasonable in 
concluding that this is a “doctrinally confusing area.” Id. at 888. However, it is clear 
that a law may be considered a hybrid restraint, in that it gives a degree of regulatory 
power to individuals, see supra Part III.A.1.a., but that the law may also be immune 
because the state reviews the individuals’ exercise of that power for reasonableness. 
See supra Part III.A.2.b. 
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was a hybrid restraint. The court explained that while the 
wholesalers are not required to match others’ prices, “the 
logical result of the restraints is a less uncertain market, a 
market more conducive to collusive and stabilized pricing, and 
hence a less competitive market.”251 In other words, Washington 
set up a system that facilitated price-fixing by private parties.252 
The court then concluded that the law was also a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act because it was “highly likely to 
facilitate horizontal collusion among market participants.”253 
Moving on to the antitrust immunity issue, i.e., state-
action doctrine, the court applied Miller to the case and held 
that Washington, like Oregon, failed to actively supervise its 
post and hold scheme,254 and thus had not established immunity 
for the scheme.255 Finally, the court considered whether the post 
and hold restraint was saved by the Twenty-first Amendment 
defense.256 This time, a factual record had been developed on the 
issue and the district court had already decided against 
Washington.257 The court affirmed the decision against the 
state, agreeing with the district court that temperance was a 
“valid and important interest” under the Twenty-first 
Amendment, but Washington failed to show that the post and 
hold regulation promoted temperance.258 In doing so, the court 
repeated the district court’s finding that “there was little 
empirical evidence documenting the relationship between such 
pricing schemes and consumption.”259 
Although Section 101-b was facially challenged and 
upheld in Battipaglia,260 it has become clearer over time that 
contrary to Battipaglia’s characterization of Section 101-b as 
the “exchange of price information” that should be subject to a 
rule of reason analysis,261 it is in fact a post and hold provision 
and thus a “classic hybrid restraint.”262 It is inappropriate to 
  
 251 Costco, 522 F.3d at 888, 893-94. 
 252 See id. at 894-95. 
 253 Id. at 895-96. Like the court in TFWS, the Costco court discussed 
Battipaglia and then declined to follow it. See id. at 893-94; supra note 238. 
 254 Costco, 522 F.3d at 901 n.22. 
 255 See supra Part III.A.2.b. (explaining that states are often barred from 
immunity due to the absence of active supervision)  
 256 Costco, 522 F.3d at 901-04. 
 257 Id. at 902-03. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. at 903. 
 260 See supra notes 206-215 and accompanying text. 
 261 Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 262 TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 208 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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conclude that Section 101-b will be struck down on an antitrust 
challenge without any evidence regarding the Twenty-first 
Amendment defense.263 Nevertheless, the following section will 
apply the analysis outlined above264 to Section 101-b to 
demonstrate why it is unlikely that the State of New York can 
protect Section 101-b in an antitrust challenge. 
IV. ABC LAW SECTION 101-b WILL LIKELY LOSE ON AN 
ANTITRUST CHALLENGE 
Given the evolution of the jurisprudence in the Supreme 
Court and the federal courts regarding liquor laws that mandate 
anticompetitive behavior, it seems very unlikely that Section 101-
b would be able to withstand another antitrust challenge. Section 
101-b, like the post and hold restraints at issue in Miller,265 
TFWS,266 and Costco,267 requires not only the filing of prices, but 
also adherence to those prices. To recap the requirements of 
Section 101-b, manufacturers and wholesalers must file a 
monthly posting with the State Liquor Authority (“SLA”) that will 
go into effect for the following pricing period after a three-day 
window in which prices may be reduced to match the lowest 
posted price for the same product.268 Once the prices are in effect, 
they cannot be changed without the SLA’s prior written 
permission.269 Since Section 101-b is very similar to the post and 
hold restraints challenged and struck down by Miller, TFWS, and 
Costco, it should be analyzed in the same manner.  
First, Section 101-b is preempted by the Sherman Act 
because it is a hybrid restraint and a per se violation of the Act. 
As noted above, while the Second Circuit declared that Section 
101-b simply requires exchanging price information, the 
majority conveniently overlooked the holding aspect of Section 
  
 263 See Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344, 1352 (9th Cir. 1987); see also supra 
note 243 and accompanying text. 
 264 See supra Part III.A (illustrated in Part III.B.). 
 265 See supra notes 221-233 and accompanying text.  
 266 See supra notes 234-247 and accompanying text.  
 267 See supra notes 248-259 and accompanying text. 
 268 See supra notes 75-77. At first glance, the statute may seem beneficial to 
consumers as it allows manufacturers and wholesalers to decrease their prices to the 
lowest price posted. The harm is that generally there is an ongoing possibility that, in a 
free market, prices for a good will fluctuate; here, after the three-day window ends the 
manufacturers and wholesalers are unable to lower prices even if the market would 
justify a reduction. In other words, consumers lose the benefits of competition as the 
manufacturers and wholesalers simply have no incentives to compete via price changes 
after the posting period goes into effect (because they know they cannot be undercut). 
 269 See supra notes 75-77. 
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101-b,270 which is the primary reason this type of law is 
problematic. The holding aspect of Section 101-b “logical[ly] 
result[s] . . . [in] a less uncertain market, . . . and hence a less 
competitive market.”271 In 2004, the Second Circuit stated, 
“[w]here the anticompetitive effects of a state statute obviate 
the need for private parties to act on their own to create an 
anticompetitive scheme, the statute may be attacked as a 
‘hybrid’ restraint.”272 Section 101-b is therefore a hybrid 
restraint because it delegates private regulatory power to the 
distributors and wholesalers by allowing them to set the prices, 
which the State merely enforces. In other words, Section 101-b 
is not a unilateral restraint because of the degree of power 
given to private market participants, and it is also not a 
private restraint because of the State’s authorization.273 It is 
also significant that Section 101-b involves a price restraint 
because a price restraint is especially prone to being deemed a 
hybrid restraint.274 Consistent with the Second Circuit’s 
requirements under its more recent approach to the issue of 
hybrid restraints, New York’s price posting regime reduces the 
need for liquor dealers and wholesalers to create their own 
anticompetitive scheme. Thus, Section 101-b is a hybrid 
restraint subject to preemption. 
Section 101-b is also a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act and is thus preempted. By forcing manufacturers and 
wholesalers to hold to their announced prices, the state 
“mandates activity that is essentially a form of horizontal price 
fixing.”275 As the Costco court explained, horizontal collusion 
allows market participants to maximize profits via price (and 
production) coordination at the expense of consumers by 
increasing prices (and decreasing production).276 Requiring 
adherence to posted prices makes price cuts irrevocable, and 
thus “much less likely.”277 Furthermore, as the Miller court 
  
 270 The dissent, meanwhile, emphasized the significance of the holding 
requirement. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.  
 271 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 892-94 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 272 Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 223-24 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(holding that New York’s Contraband Statutes were hybrid restraints subject to 
preemption by the Sherman Act for enforcing price-fixing among major tobacco 
producers). 
 273 See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
 274 See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.  
 275 TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 208 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 276 Costco, 522 F.3d at 896. 
 277 Id. 
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explicitly stated, “[a]n agreement to adhere to previously 
announced prices . . . is unlawful per se under the Sherman 
Act.”278 While the majority in Battipaglia refrained from 
deciding whether Section 101-b could be preempted by the 
Sherman Act without actual agreement between the 
manufacturers and/or wholesalers, that issue has since been 
decided.279 In 324 Liquor, the Supreme Court held that a per se 
violation may be found in the absence of a private agreement if 
the state compels activity that would otherwise be a per se 
violation.280 Indeed, the Second Circuit has since acknowledged 
that the Supreme Court does not require actual agreement as a 
prerequisite to preemption under the Sherman Act.281 Thus, 
Section 101-b is a hybrid restraint for delegating regulatory 
power to private individuals, and it is a per se violation because 
adhering to posted prices is illegal under the Sherman Act. 
Second, Section 101-b is most likely not immune under 
the state-action doctrine. As required by prong one of the 
Midcal test for antitrust immunity,282 New York has “‘clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’” its 
intent to promote temperance and orderly market conditions by 
prohibiting price discrimination with Section 101-b.283 In 
Midcal, California satisfied prong one of the test when it 
clearly stated its goal of permitting price resale maintenance as 
legislative policy.284 The Supreme Court similarly found prong 
one satisfied in 324 Liquor, where New York also clearly 
intended to allow price resale maintenance.285 Interestingly, in 
Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer,286 the Second Circuit found 
that New York failed to satisfy prong one of Midcal when it 
claimed an interest in revenue production was the underlying 
  
 278 Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 279 See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1987). 
 280 Id. 
 281 See Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 224 n.17 (2d Cir. 
2004); see 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 345-46 & n.8. 
 282 See supra Part III.A.2.a. for a refresher on Midcal’s first prong to establish 
immunity under the state-action doctrine. 
 283 Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 
1984) (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 
105). In dissent, Judge Winter stated that New York’s policy of “creating a cartel” with 
Section 101-b was “‘one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed’ by the state,” 
which satisfied the first part of the Midcal test. Id. at 180 (Winter, J. dissenting) 
(quoting Midcal, 445 U.S. 97 at 105); see also N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b(1). 
 284 See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105. 
 285 See 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 344. 
 286 357 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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goal of enforcing a price-fixing scheme among major tobacco 
producers.287 The Second Circuit explained, “an ancillary 
function of the first Midcal prong is to establish the legitimate 
State policy underlying the decision to displace the Sherman 
Act.”288 Even if the legitimacy of New York’s interests are 
assessed at this stage of the analysis, as opposed to waiting 
until the Twenty-first Amendment defense is raised,289 New 
York will still likely satisfy prong one of Midcal because its 
interests in promoting temperance and orderly market 
conditions involve public and economic interests beyond mere 
revenue production for the state. 
While Section 101-b will probably pass the first inquiry 
under Midcal, it most likely will fail Midcal’s second prong, 
which requires that New York “actively supervise” the 
implementation of Section 101-b.290 Post and hold restraints 
similar to Section 101-b have repeatedly failed to satisfy prong 
two of Midcal because the states responsible for the laws 
“neither establishe[d] prices nor review[ed] the reasonableness 
of the price schedules,” and the states failed to “monitor market 
conditions or engage in any ‘pointed reexamination’ of the 
program[s].”291 In finding that ABC Law Section 101-bb was not 
actively supervised by New York, the Supreme Court in 324 
Liquor reasoned, “[t]he State has displaced competition among 
liquor retailers without substituting an adequate system of 
regulation.”292 Judge Winter, in his dissent from the Battipaglia 
majority, stated that New York “does nothing whatsoever to 
establish the actual prices charged, review their 
reasonableness, monitor market conditions, or engage in 
reexamination of the program.”293 As it had done in 324 Liquor, 
New York persists in displacing competition without an 
  
 287 See id. at 230. 
 288 Id. 
 289 See supra Part III.A.3. 
 290 See supra Part III.A.2.b. 
 291 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 
105-06 (1980) (citation omitted); see also Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 
874, 901 n.22 (9th Cir. 2008); TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 211 (4th Cir. 2001); 
Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344, 1351-52 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 292 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1987). 
 293 Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 180 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(Winter, J., dissenting). Indeed, the New York State Law Revision Commission reported 
that the SLA does not monitor posted prices. See NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION 
COMMISSION REPORT ON THE ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW AND ITS 
ADMINISTRATION [Hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT PART ONE], 34 (September 30, 2009), 
available at http://www.lawrevision.state.ny.us/abcls.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
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adequate system of regulation by giving manufacturers and 
wholesalers discretion over prices and enforcing them without 
regard to their reasonableness. Accordingly, Section 101-b will 
most likely not be immune, for failing prong two of Midcal. 
Finally, it is very unlikely that Section 101-b will 
prevail if New York asserts the Twenty-first Amendment 
defense. Not only must New York have a legitimate policy 
supporting Section 101-b, the law must also be effective in 
serving that policy.294 In determining whether New York’s 
interests are legitimate, a court must find that they are “closely 
related” to the goals of the Twenty-first Amendment,295 and that 
New York’s interests outweigh the federal interests of the 
Sherman Act, which has been described as “the Magna Carta of 
free enterprise.”296 As an initial matter, New York’s stated 
interest in promoting temperance is certainly a legitimate state 
interest.297 New York also has expressed intent to prohibit price 
discrimination for the purpose of orderly markets,298 which is 
also likely a legitimate state interest.299 However, the Twenty-
first Amendment will likely fail to protect Section 101-b 
because New York will probably not be able to meet its burden 
of showing that Section 101-b actually promotes temperance, 
prevents price discrimination, or promotes orderly markets. 
In order to show that Section 101-b substantiates its 
purported goals, New York will have to spend considerable 
time and money to produce persuasive evidence. With respect 
to showing that Section 101-b promotes temperance, perhaps 
New York could prepare analytic state studies on consumption, 
possibly distinguishing between New York and another state 
without a post and hold restraint in place. However, a 
  
 294 See supra Part III.A.3. 
 295 Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984); see supra note 
112-113 and accompanying text. 
 296 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 110; see supra Part III.A.3. 
 297 See supra notes 192, 243, and 258 and accompanying text.  
 298 N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b(1) (McKinney 2009). 
 299 With respect to New York’s interest in promoting orderly markets, this 
argument was addressed in a footnote by the Costco court. See Costco Wholesale Corp. 
v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 902 n.23 (9th Cir. 2008). Washington cited North Dakota v. 
United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) as support for its argument that it had an 
interest in orderly markets, but the court explained the concept of “orderly markets” 
was hard to define and thus there could be no clear error by the district court in 
deciding that this interest was not substantiated by the challenged post and hold 
restraint. Id. With respect to prohibiting price discrimination, the Miller court 
apparently accepted that this was a legitimate state interest as well, as the court went 
on to inquire whether the interest was substantiated, ultimately finding it was not. See 
Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344, 1352; see also supra notes 231-233.  
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challenger may rebut such evidence and a court does not have 
to give deference to the state’s evidence.300 With respect to 
preventing price discrimination and promoting orderly 
markets, New York could present state agency reports and/or 
congressional studies regarding effects of Section 101-b on 
market conditions, and empirical economic evidence.301 Of 
course, these studies must first be performed, assuming no 
such studies on this precise issue have been prepared as of 
yet.302 A challenger may also produce conflicting studies, again 
giving a court the choice of whose evidence to accept.303 Finally, 
New York will most likely need to produce expert witness 
testimony as well,304 which may also be rebutted.  
This is not to say that it is impossible for New York to 
save Section 101-b if it is challenged. Rather, it is to emphasize 
the amount of effort that New York will have to invest to show 
that Section 101-b should be sustained, and that even with 
extensive evidence, there is no guarantee that a court will find 
in New York’s favor. Unless New York is able to develop a 
record showing Section 101-b fosters its stated interests, 
Section 101-b will be struck down on an antitrust challenge. 
Unsubstantiated state interests, no matter how closely related 
to the Twenty-first Amendment, cannot outweigh the Sherman 
Act’s policy of promoting competition.305  
  
 300 See supra note 200 and accompanying text (explaining that a court will 
examine evidence to the contrary). 
 301 See supra notes 243-247 and accompanying text. 
 302 This seems to be a fair assumption considering the New York State Law 
Revision Commission’s recent findings:  
The SLA is unable to determine industry’s compliance with the law. Price 
posting information is not monitored so it is no surprise that the SLA would 
fail to detect abuses in the industry. Because it does not monitor the 
information, it is unable to demonstrate that the objectives of the post and 
hold process are achieved. 
COMMISSION REPORT PART ONE at 34. 
 303 For example, in Miller, while Washington argued that its post and hold 
restraint prevented price discrimination, the court agreed with the challenger that 
rather than prevent price discrimination, the price posting laws simply “authoriz[ed], 
facilitat[ed], and induc[ed] horizontal price fixing.” Miller v. Hedlund, 717 F. Supp. 711, 
715-16 (D. Or. 1989). 
 304 See supra notes 243-247 and accompanying text. 
 305 See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Given the problems that alcohol has caused in the past 
and continues to cause today,306 it is no surprise that New York 
wants to have special regulations imposed on the liquor 
industry. However, it is unreasonable to be overly concerned 
with the regulation of alcohol distribution at the expense of the 
Sherman Act, and the goals of the Sherman Act should not be 
discarded. Quite the contrary, these goals are just as important 
to the promotion of social welfare as the desire to prevent 
excessive consumption and price discrimination.307 However, if 
New York insists upon sacrificing the pro-competition policy of 
the Sherman Act, it must take a more proactive role in 
implementing Section 101-b,308 which would probably take no 
more effort than putting up a strong defense under the Twenty-
first Amendment. Whether New York wishes to create or find 
evidence conclusively showing that Section 101-b actually 
promotes temperance, prevents price discrimination, or 
promotes orderly markets, or whether New York wishes to take 
a more active role in supervising its price posting system, one 
thing is clear: some sort of action should be taken to prevent 
the law invalidation in the event of an antitrust challenge. 
Despite confusing and sometimes inconsistent individual 
opinions regarding the Twenty-first Amendment’s protection of 
liquor regulations,309 it has become increasingly clear over time 
that the current state of the law will not permit Section 101-b 
to stand if challenged. 
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restraint. See supra Part III.A.2.b. 
 309 See supra Part II. 
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